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Regulatory Takings:
When Is Enough, Enough?
JACQUELINE KERRY HEYMAN*
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the government from taking private property without just compensation.'
Takings cases tend to involve long-running disputes between govern-
ment and private property owners as to whether a governmental
regulation constitutes a partial taking2 by virtue of the regulatory
restriction or a permanent physical occupation,3 and what determining
test should be undertaken in drawing the distinction. The principal
question becomes whether a partial deprivation stemming from a
regulatory imposition that deprives the property owner of substantial, but
not all economic use or value of the property constitutes a partial
regulatory taking for which compensation is justified.' Since the first
time the Supreme Court announced that regulatory takings5 are compen-
sable under the Fifth Amendment,6 this question has been the subject of
intense debate. However, to date, the Court has failed to provide an
adequate answer.
Executive Editor, JoURNAL OF NATURAL REsouRcEs AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, J.D.,
1996, B.A., 1992, University of Kentucky.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation .... ").
2 "The taking of part of an owner's property under the laws of eminent domain.
Compensation must be based on damages or benefits to the remaining property, as well as the part
taken." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 362 (6th ed. 1990).
3 Occurring under "[t]he 'eminent domain' power refer[ring] to the state's prerogative to
seize private property, dispossess its owner, and assume full legal right and title to it in the name of
some ostensible public good," including "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced
additions of water, earth, sand, or other material" as a result of governmental action. Jeb Rubenfeld,
Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081, 1084 (1993) (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166 (1871)).
4 Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1053 (1987), 18 F.3d 1560, 1568 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 898 (1995).
5 Governmental regulations that destroy the economic viability of land constitute a taking.
Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1092 (1993) (citation omitted).
6 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See Richard A. Epstein,
Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369
(1993) (including a detailed academic discussion of Lucas and the problems of regulatory takings);
Rubenfeld, supra note 3 (providing a comprehensive examination of takings law and compensation
as a matter of constitutional principle).
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The Supreme Court readily admits there is no distinct formula or
test applicable in the determination of whether the Constitution requires
a property owner be provided compensation for a government imposed
restriction.7 Rather, the Court has concluded the decision rests "upon
the particular circumstances [in that] case."' As such, the Court will
engage in an essentially "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]." 9 The Court has
identified several factors that may be significant in the analysis,
including the "economic impact"'0 the particular claimant will bear as a
result of the regulation-particularly the extent of the regulation's
interference with "investment-backed expectations,""-and the
character of the governmental action.'
2
Part I of this Note provides the historical background leading to the
development of the ad hoc factual inquiry. Part II explores the applica-
ble standard of judicial review. Part III furnishes an examination of
assorted judicial interpretations of partial takings as opposed to physical
takings. Part IV discusses the question of whether "economic impact"
and "investment-backed expectations" serve as legitimate balancing
criteria for protection against uncompensated takings. The conclusion
focuses on the current state of regulatory law and the potential future of
regulatory restrictions.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AD Hoc FACTUAL INQUIRY
Presently, there exist two lines of compensation authority: 1) the
traditional physical occupation theory, and 2) the recently recognized
regulatory taking theory. A physical occupation of property is found
when "the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of permanent
physical occupation."' 3 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., state legislation requiring landlords to permit the placement of
cable television equipment on their buildings resulted in the occupancy
of "about one-eighth of a cubic foot" of roof space. 4 Nonetheless, the





,2 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See also Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704,705 (1987).
"3 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,426 (1982) (holding that
a taking had occurred where government authorized the placement of cable television cable and
connection boxes on the roof of an apartment building).
14 Id. at 443.
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Court held a taking had occurred. 5 The Supreme Court did not resolve
the issue regarding the proper amount of compensation. 16 Hence, it
remains insignificant in these instances whether an action is undertaken
to achieve an important public purpose or results in only minimal impact
on the landowner.' 7 Where a physical occupation has occurred by virtue
of governmental action, compensation is required. 8
The traditional underpinnings of physical occupation theory do not
fit comfortably with the notion of regulatory taking compensation. This
difficulty was clearly stated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon9 in
which Justice Holmes declared:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law. As long recognized some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the
extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude,
in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question
depends on the particular facts....
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking .... We are in danger of forgetting that a
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change....'o
Until 1978, the Court largely adjudicated regulatory enactments
affecting land use as a question of whether the restrictions were
constitutionally valid. Moreover, the Court principally left to the state
courts the determination of whether the regulatory impositions passed
15 Id.
16 Id. at 423.
17 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
18 1&.
' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
'0 Id at415-16.
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constitutional muster.2' In the event that the regulation was found to
have gone "too far," the landowner's sole form of relief was judicial
invalidation of the intrusive legislation.22  "Curiously, these court
opinions often did not bother to mention exactly what provision of the
Constitution was violated."' That statement might serve as a potential
explanation as to why, for over fifty years, the constitutional alternative
of holding an overly intrusive regulation valid while holding that it
operates as a taking requiring just compensation did not attract judicial
attention.24
A. Penn Central and the Application of the Fifth Amendment
Commencing with Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of intrusive regulation as
violative of the Fifth Amendment and applied the remedy applicable to
a taking as opposed to striking the regulation as unlawful. Perhaps the
Court's change of direction was motivated by the increasing number of
regulatory restrictions on land use. Alternatively, there remains debate
for Justice Brennan's expression in Penn Central "that the Constitution
meant what it said-a taking, whether regulatory or physical, mandated
that the property owner be paid just compensation. After-the-fact
invalidation of the offending regulation would not satisfy the constitu-
tional mandate."26
The Court was faced with a claim from Penn Central Transportation
Co. following the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commis-
sion's failure to approve a 55-story office building over Grand Central
Terminal.27 Penn Central alleged, among other things, a taking of
property without just compensation.28 Penn Central claimed the
regulation operated as an arbitrary deprivation of the owners' property
rights without due process of law.29
The principal issue the Court addressed was under what operative
conditions a regulatory taking occurs. Relying on Justice Holmes'
21 Id at 421 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
2 Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
23 Id
2A Id
2' Penn Cent. Transp, Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2 Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1372.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 117.





analysis in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,3° the Court formulated a
three factor analysis which served as the precursor to the ad hoc factual
inquiry. The analysis encompassed evaluation of: 1) the character of the
governmental action; 2) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant; and, 3) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct, investment-backed expectations."
One method by which Penn Central attempted to establish a taking
was by showing the owner had been denied the right to exploit the
superadjacent airspace. 2 The Court was not persuaded by this argument
due to the transportation company's total disregard for the remaining
parcel of property.33
Its designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates
that appellants may continue to use the property precisely as it
has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal
containing office space and concessions. So the law does not
interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary
expectation concerning the use of the parcel. More impor-
tantly, on this record, we must regard the New York City law
as permitting Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal
but also to obtain a "reasonable return" on its investment.
34
Because the Court held no taking had occurred, it did not address
the issue of possible remedies.35 The Court determined the denial of the
right to build a structure above the terminal did not serve as a denial of
Penn Central's constitutional right to just compensation. 36 Additionally,
the Court found meritorious Penn Central's ability to transfer the
airspace rights to other parcels of property within the vicinity of the
terminal. 37 "While these rights may well not have constituted 'just
compensation' if a 'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless
undoubtably mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed
... and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the
' See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
3' Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
32 Id. at 130, 135.
33 d. at 135-36.
34 Id. at 136.
" Id at 136. The Court was further influenced by the fact that the preexisting air rights above
the terminal were made transferable to at least eight nearby parcels, one or two of which had been
determined suitable for the construction of the new office building. Id
' Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
37 id.
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impact of the regulation. 38 The Court concluded that the regulatory
imposition did not effect a taking since the imposed restrictions were
"substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not
only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford
... opportunities [for] further enhance[ment] not only to the Terminal
site proper but also other properties. ' 9
B. First English and the Appropriate Remedy
Ultimately, debate over the issue of whether a regulatory taking
could occur and require compensation resulted in the decision of First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles.' Here,
the Court was not confronted with the issue of determining whether
there had actually been a taking since the California Court of Appeals
had previously assumed the original complaint sought monetary
damages for the taking of all use of the landowner's property and treated
the case as a takings action.4' Hence, the Supreme Court assumed the
state court's disposition that a regulatory taking had occurred and
isolated its review to the matter of remedy.42
At issue was a state regulation which prevented a landowner from
rebuilding structures on a privately owned parcel of property following
destruction by flood.43 The regulation's justification stemmed from the
state's desire to prohibit construction of new buildings on floodplains.'
The Court held the Constitution required just compensation for a
regulatory taking; the taking occurred from the effective date of the
regulation until the time the state determined to amend or rescind the
regulation.4' The Court held that compensation was owed even if the
taking was temporary, and even if the regulation operated to protect the
public health and safety.46 The Court reasoned that "[ilt is the owner's
loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the
property taken., 47 The Court further stated:
39 id.
39 id.
'o First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. at 304
(1987).
41 Id. at 311.
42 ld
13 Id at 307.
4 First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
43 d.
4 Idat 321.
47 Id. at 319 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).
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Where this burden results from governmental action that
amounted to a taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the land-
owner for the value of the use of the land during this period..
. .Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor ordinance after
this period of time, though converting the taking into a "tempo-
rary" one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the
Just Compensation Clause.4
The Court appeared to be influenced by Justice Brennan's dissent in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,49 where he stated,
"Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings' must
be permanent and irrevocable.""0
Thus, Penn Central resolved the issue as to when a regulatory
taking occurred while First English answered the question of the
appropriate remedy. First English is not limited to temporary takings;
rather, it stands for the premise that "[i]t is axiomatic that the Fifth
Amendment's just compensation provision is 'designed to bar Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Yet,
despite the factors set forth in Penn Central regarding the determination
as to whether the government has imposed a regulatory taking, the
analysis remained an ad hoc, factual inquiry. The ad hoc inquiry appears
to be prone to intensely subjective judicial interpretation.
An advantage of the ad hoc analysis remains in that it allows the
Court to avoid the conceptual conflicts arising out of evaluating the
importance of the governmental interest versus calculating the actual
economic impact suffered by the landowner.52 Both of these aspects
remain elements of the Penn Central test and, as such, allow the
judiciary a bypass means of pitting one interest against the other. As a
result, determining whether a taking has occurred, in addition to
determining the applicable remedy, have produced conflicting results.
4 id.
' San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
50 First English, 482 U.S. at 318 (citing San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 657).
5' Id. at 318-19 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). In First
English, the ordinance adopted by the County of Los Angeles was promulgated and effectuated
immediately, and although the petitioners filed suit within thirty days, by the time the claim was
brought before the California Supreme Court, there existed a question regarding the merits of the
claimant's demand for compensation. Id. at 308, 309 n.3.
52 See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1090.
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U. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Earlier Cases
The analysis delivered in Penn Central is not a strict three-pronged
test to which the courts must adhere, but serves principally as a guide for
conducting a balancing test. Thus, the Supreme Court has continuously
delivered "takings" case opinions producing results not necessarily
consistent with the Penn Central analysis.5 3 In Agins v. City of
Tiburon,54 the Court announced a two-part test for considering whether
a regulation operated as a taking. The test considered whether the
regulation failed to substantially advance a legitimate state purpose and
whether the property owner was deprived of economically viable use of
the land.55 Consistent with the Penn Central posture was the Court's
adherence to the notion of weighing private versus public interests in
deciding takings cases." For a taking to be found, the Court must
determine "that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear
the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest.
5
In addition, the Court continued to reevaluate the concept of
property in its various analyses. Penn Central held that in evaluating a
takings case the Court was not compelled to
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular govern-
mental action has effected a taking, [the] Court focuses rather
both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole ....s8
However, in subsequent decisions the Court decided rather than address
the property rights issue as a "bundle of rights," the appropriate
51 See infra text accompanying notes 104-244; see also Michael S. Greve, Property Rights
At The Bicentennial: Course Correction or Constitutional Revolution?, 25 BEVERLY HILLS B.A. J.
114(1991).
' Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). At issue in Agins was whether the city's
open-space zoning ordinance restricting the use of previously purchased property operated as a taking
requiring just compensation. Id. at 257.
I' d. at 260.
Id. at 26 1.
5' Id. at 260.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
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approach was to construe property rights as "strands" in such a bundle. 9
In Andrus v. Allard, the Supreme Court held that a complete
prohibition on the sale of avian artifacts under the Eagle Protection Act
and Migratory Bird Treaty Act did not constitute a taking.' In the
Court's view "[t]he denial of one traditional property right does not
always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full
'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle
is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. '"61
Upon review of the regulation, the Court undeniably recognized the
regulation prevented the most profitable use of the claimant's property.6'
Nonetheless, the Court found that "a reduction in the value of property
is not necessarily equated with a taking. 63 At issue in Andrus was a
regulation on the use of personal and not real property, and potentially
the Court rested its assessment on this distinction.' "[L]oss of future
profits-unaccompanied by any physical property restriction -provides
a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim."' The reed was not
nearly as slender as perceived; in subsequent decisions this distinction
was eliminated. 6
The Court also found that the weight of the strands (or sticks) may
be taken into consideration. Kaiser Aetna v. United States67 addressed
a situation where the owners of private property constructed a marina
and inlets that constituted navigable waterways of the United States.6
The Court held that a regulation which precluded the owner from
denying the public access to an otherwise private facility constituted a
physical occupation requiring just compensation. 69 Essentially, the
Court considered the issue in this case as a larger, weightier "stick" in
the bundle of property rights than that addressed in Andrus. In Kaiser
Aetna, "the owner ha[d] somehow lost one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property-the
" Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
60 Id
61 Id at 65-66.
62 Id at 66.
" Id. at 66. It was noted that it was unclear whether other methods of economic benefit could
be derived from the property, such as putting the artifacts on exhibit and charging an admission. Id
6 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67.
65 Idat 66.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
67 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
69 Id at 179-80.
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right to exclude others."7
This view appears to have stemmed from a perspective that the
value of the right will be determined according to the apparent size or
significance of the "stick." Perhaps the distinction between real and
personal property offers an explanation for the different weighing of
relative values.7 On the other hand, one may assume the posture that
Kaiser Aetna's right to exclude was deemed substantial, as where
Andrus' right to sell or convey was insignificant simply by virtue of the
size or importance of the property to which the affected right was
attached.
The Supreme Court applied a more straightforward test in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,72 where an
association of coal producers brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the
constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.73
Since the claim arose as a facial challenge to the Surface Mining Act,
there was no controversy regarding the Act's effect on specific parcels
of land or the bundle of rights attached thereto.74  Rather, the issue
before the Court was whether the "mere enactment" of the Surface
Mining Act constituted a taking. 5
Relying on Agins, the Court determined the proper test for deciding
whether a statute regulating the uses of property effects a taking is in
light of whether the restriction "denies an owner economically viable use
of his land.... ,76 The Court reasoned that the Act did not prevent all
beneficial use of the coal-bearing lands.77 Although the Act prohibited
mining near certain locations and regulated conditions under which all
mining could be conducted, it did not regulate alternative non-mining
uses to which the coal bearing property could be put.78 Apparently, the
70 Id. at 176.
7' As previously noted the Court eventually altered its position on this distinction. See supra
text accompanying notes 60-66.
' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
71 It See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 1211-
1230(a), 1231-1243, 1251-1279, 1281,1291-1309, 1311-1316, 1321-1328 (1994).
74 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295.
71 i& The claims with respect to violation of the Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Act's provision for the imposition of civil
penalties are not discussed herein.
76 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981).
(citation omitted).
" I at 296.
Id. The Court concluded that the "mere enactment" of the Surface Mining Act did not
deprive appellees of economically viable use of their land. There was further concern regarding
whether appellees' "taking" challenge was premature. Id. at 297.
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Court gave great deference to the district court's finding that landowners
could simply level the land without mining the coal because the value of
level land in this steep-slope area of Virginia maintained a premium
value.79
One of the principal cases addressing the issue of partial regulatory
taking was Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis.5 In
Keystone, coal companies brought an action challenging Pennsylvania's
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act. The Act required 50%
of the coal located beneath certain structures to be kept in place to
provide support for the surface estate. In line with the test employed in
Agins, the Keystone analysis stipulated a regulation effected a taking if
it either: 1) "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests," or
2) "denies an owner of economically viable use of his land."'" Here the
test for a regulatory taking required comparing the value that had been
taken from the property with the value that remained.82 For the
determination of diminution in value as a result of the regulation, the
Court refused to treat the coal required to be left in the ground as a
separate parcel of property for which all value had been lost.83 Rather,
the Court's central problem was that the Act had not made it commer-
cially impracticable for the petitioner to continue mining bituminous
coal. The Act merely required that less than 2% of the involved coal be
left in the ground.'
The issue of compensation appeared to become focused on the
extent of economic injury suffered by the landowner. Resounding the
"sticks in the bundle" language employed in Andrus, the Court appeared
to permit any rational legislative purpose, provided the size of the stick
being removed from the landowner's bundle was not too significant.
Given the "small percentage" of the regulated coal combined with the
absence of an actual physical appropriation, the Court reasoned the
landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations were not
materially affected.85 In the presence of any rational relationship, the
79 Id at 297, n.38.
'o Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
8I Id at 485 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
82 Id. at 497.
8 id
Id at 496. The Court was further influenced by the fact that the petitioners had failed to
establish the existence of a single mine which could no longer be operated for profit. Id
8 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,499 (1987). The Court's
emphasis on the small percentage of coal affected is somewhat confusing in consideration of its dicta
stating:
We do not suggest that the State may physically appropriate relatively small amounts of private
1995-961
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regulation was viewed as an authorized exercise of the state's police
power.
The Courts have continually vacillated on the issue of whether a
regulation should not require compensation in the event any practicable
use remained in the property. Thus, exactly what rights remain
significant is unclear and unanswered. However, in Nollan v. Califomia
Coastal Commission 6 the Supreme Court finally established a standard
of review applicable to takings cases.
B. Nollan and the Requirement of a Higher Standard of Review
Nollan serves as the pinnacle case in takings jurisprudence. The
case involved a suit brought by the owners of a bungalow on beachfront
property.' In an effort to obtain a rebuilding permit for the construction
of a three-bedroom home, the California Coastal Commission imposed
as a condition of approval the requirement that the owners provide
lateral access for the public to pass across their property to the public
beach.88 The government asserted construction of the Nollan's new
house would interfere with the public's "visual access" to the beach,
thus creating a psychological barrier to public access to the beach.89 The
state justified the access condition as a valid exercise of its land use
regulation power in preventing a "burden [to] the public's ability to
traverse to and along the shorefront...9. "Had California simply required
the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the
public on a permanent basis ... rather than conditioning their permit on
their agreeing to do so [under the auspices of regulatory power]... no
doubt there would have been a taking."'"
The Supreme Court agreed with the Nollans' contention that the
condition imposed by California was violative of the Fifth Amendment's
takings clause.92 The majority opinion recognized prior cases had
property for its own use without paying just compensation. The question here is whether there
has been any taking at all when no coal has been physically appropriated, and the regulatory
program placed a burden on the use of only a small fraction of the property that is subject to
regulation.
Id at n.27.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
h. at 827.
I hd. at 828.
I da. at 838.
90 kI. at 829.




described the necessary condition for abridgement of property rights vis-
A-vis the state police power as a "substantial advanc[ing] of a legitimate
state interest.93 However, the Court noted its inclination
to be particularly careful about the adjective [substantial] where
the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is a
heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensa-
tion requirement, rather than the stated police-power
objective."
The Court concluded that in order to pass constitutional muster, a
restrictive condition placed on property rights must "substantially
advance" a "legitimate state interest."'95 Discussion was given to the
Government's requirement to establish a close "fit" or "nexus" between
the regulatory condition and purpose of the original restriction.96 In the
Nollan's case, the requisite nexus was lacking as the Court considered
the Government's claim of a legitimate state interest in the prevention of
a publicly perceived "psychological barrier"97 to beach access to "not
meet even the most untailored standards." 9 Rather, the Court required
a precise fit based upon the assumption that private landowners possess
reasonable expectations regarding the use of their land.99 Among these
expectations is the right to exclude others, which is "one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property."'"u In sum, the facts presented in Nollan inspired the
conclusion that "unless a permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion."'
The end result from Nollan was the application of the nexus test and
a heightened standard of review to taking cases. However, the courts
continue to apply the ad hoc factual inquiry method imposed by Penn
9' Id at 841.
94 d
95 Id at 834. The Court quoted Penn Central as holding that "a use restriction may constitute
a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose." Id.
(citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
9 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837-38.
97 Id at 838.
98 Id. at 838.
99 See id at 836.
'o Id at 831 (citations omitted).
"' Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (citations omitted).
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Central. The U.S. Claims Court has afforded the greatest deference to
the Nollan heightened standard of review. The Claims Court has
routinely been guided by the principles set forth in that decision."° The
effect of this application is demonstrated in cases concerning the
question of partial regulatory takings. Although there is no theoretical
rationale for the distinction, the logic that there must be a complete
deprivation and denial of the "bundle of rights" prior to the need for just
compensation has remained. This concept was clearly demonstrated in
Penn Central where the Court concluded that since the transportation
company still maintained the physical terminal and underlying property,
no partial taking had been effectuated. 3 The juxtaposition of legal
conclusions respecting this matter is most readily illustrated by compar-
ing cases on the issue.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF PARTIAL REGULATORY TAKINGS
AS OPPOSED TO PHYSICAL TAKINGS
A. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Prior to discussing the Claims Court's treatment of regulatory taking
cases under the Nollan standard of review, it is worth addressing the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,"° given the potential implications of the case's dicta
regarding partial regulatory takings. The issue in Lucas again was
whether a regulatory taking was compensable under the Fifth Amend-
ment. 05 Although the status of permanent partial regulatory taking was
not addressed, under the Lucas analysis one may be able to conclude
such takings to be a noncompensable exercise of the state's police
power. According to Justice Scalia, who wrote for the Majority, if the
restriction is partial, the constitutional inquiry terminates and the
regulation is sustained since the land use restriction has not deprived the
owner of "all economically beneficial uses" of the property.Y However,
it appears that even Justice Scalia is uncomfortable with this
distinction. 1°"
'02 See generally Greve, supra note 53.
103 See supra text accompanying note 35.
0 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
10 Id.
" Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993).
07 See id at 1374-75.
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In 1986, Lucas purchased two undeveloped waterfront residential
lots on a South Carolina barrier island for $975,000. At the time of the
purchase, the land was zoned for single family dwellings. Lucas
intended to develop one lot for his personal use and keep the remaining
lot as investment property. By 1988, South Carolina enacted the
Beachfront Management Act (BMA), prohibiting any construction
between the beachfront and identified setback lines. As a result, Lucas
was prevented from building on either lot. Lucas filed suit in state court
claiming the regulation, although perhaps a lawful exercise of the state's
police power, operated to deprive him of all his land's economic value.
Additionally, Lucas contended that the property had a negative value to
him due to the fact that the permissible uses under the BMA, which
included tenting, recreational, or use of the property for a removable
mobile home, were of less value than the real estate taxes and liability
insurance he was required to pay. 8 As previously mentioned, at no
point did Lucas claim a partial taking of the property. The only
reference to the partial taking issue was made by dicta in the Court's
opinion. '9
The state trial court held in favor of Lucas, finding the ban rendered
his property "valueless" principally due to the ordinance prohibiting any
construction on the property. The ordinance totally defeated any
reasonable investment-backed expectations and resulted in a disparate
economic impact. The Court entered a judgment in his favor for the
market value of the property plus any taxes paid after the effective date
of the ordinance."' The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed,
holding the "harmful or noxious use" akin to public nuisances exemp-
tion was applicable; thus, no compensation was required."' The South
Carolina Supreme Court's finding that the nuisance exception applied
rested in its acceptance of a legitimate and substantial public interest in
the state legislature's effort to mitigate damage to the South Carolina
beach/dune area, a valuable public resource." 2 "The erection of new
construction... contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public
resource; and that discouraging new construction in close proximity to
the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm."' '
13
109 Id. at 1369-70.
- See id. at 1374-75.
Io Id. 1372.
.. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023 (1992) (citing Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), which sustained against Due Process and Takings Clause challenges
a state's use of its police powers to enjoin a property owner from activities akin to public nuisances).
12 /d at 1022.
113 Id (citations omitted).
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In its majority opinion reversing the South Carolina high court, the
United States Supreme Court identified two discrete categories of
regulatory action that would be compensable absent an inquiry into the
public interest advanced by the restraint. First identified were regula-
tions which cause the property owner to suffer a physical "invasion" of
his land.1 4 Generally, compensation was required in these instances
regardless of how infinitesimal the invasion or how pressing the public
purpose in its support." 5
Second, categorical treatment was deemed appropriate where the
regulation denies the property owner all economically beneficial or
productive use of the land. 16 Only if the regulation "does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land" will the restriction be invalidated." 7 It is worth
noting that the language quoted from Agins makes no reference to the
requirement that all economically viable use of the land be deprived.
Thus, the question remains why total takings are distinguished from
partial takings. The direct Agins language calls for compensation upon
a finding of diminution of economically viable use and makes no
distinction as to degree. As such, there exists no rational explanation
why deprivation of any portion, regardless of how minute, should not be
compensated.
Justice Scalia stated the notion that a total loss of all economic use
may well be regarded as the "equivalent of a physical appropriation.""'
However, he offered no explanation as to why this reasoning would not
apply in the context of partial restriction imposed on land use. There
seems to be no rational reason not to apply the equivalent logic in the
context of a partial deprivation. After all, the landowner has been
stripped of "sticks" in her bundle of property rights, and compensation
for deprivation of reasonable expectations accompanying property
ownership should be applicable. The Court concedes that just compen-
sation is due in an instance of temporary taking under which the period
of duration may potentially remain limited or at least undeterminable."'
This begs the question as to why a distinction exists for partial takings,
which in most cases may be of a more permanent duration.
"4 Id. at 1015.
"' Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
..6 Id (citations omitted).
117 Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260 (1980) (citations omitted)
(emphasis omitted)).
118 Id at 1017.
19 See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
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It appears that Justice Scalia recognized the weakness of his
reasoning when he stated:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all
economically feasible use" rule is greater than its precision,
since the rule does not make clear the "property interest"
against which the loss of value is to be measured. When, for
example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a
rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would
analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened
portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered
a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the composition of
the denominator in our "deprivation" fraction has produced
inconsistent pronouncements by the Court .... The answer to
this difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the State's law of
property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular
interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant
alleges diminution in (or elimination of) value. In any event,
we avoid this difficulty in the present case, since the "interest
in land" that Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an
estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law, and
since the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that
the Beachfront Management Act left each of Lucas's
beachfront lots without economic value. 20
The foregoing passage demonstrates Justice Scalia's awareness of
the inherent problem with respect to the issue of partial regulatory
takings; that is, partial restrictions on the whole parcel of property, or
total restrictions of part of the parcel of property. Yet, rather than
address the issue, the Court offers no resolution but continues to develop
a theory on regulatory takings when the entire fee is at issue. "It is one
thing to issue restrained utterances when it is not clear what lies ahead;
it is quite another to practice evasion in the name of cautious decision
making.... Any theory on regulatory takings that openly confesses its
0 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7 (1992) (citations omitted).
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inability to come to grips with that issue is dead before it is born....
B. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States
An extension of the strategy undertaken in Lucas for vitiating
compensation claims for a regulatory (perceivably partial) taking, is that
although the regulation deprives the owner of some uses of the property
(and thus some value), a compensable taking cannot stand provided the
claimant maintains other profitable uses to which the property may be
put. Such an effort was undertaken by the Government in challenging
the taking claim asserted in Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States.
122
Previously, the Claims Court was quick to dispose of the Government's
contention and hold that a compensable taking had occurred entering an
award of nearly $60.3 million. 23 The Federal Circuit affirmed. 24
Whitney Benefits, Inc., a mining company, brought suit seeking
compensation for the regulatory taking of its mining property resulting
from enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act'5
(SMCRA). Whitney Benefits had purchased slightly less than 600 acres
on the Tongue River in Northern Wyoming solely for the purpose of
surface mining the Whitney coal located on the alluvial valley floor.'
26
The express SMCRA language prohibited any mining activity which
would "interrupt, discontinue, or preclude farming on the alluvial valley
floors. . .,27 As a result, Whitney Benefits was prohibited from mining
any of the property.
28
The Government argued that SMCRA regulated only one of several
economically beneficial uses to which the involved property could be
put). 29  As one potential alternative use, the Government asserted
Benefits' ability to farm the surface land, or retain value of the coal
121 Epstein, supra note 106, at 1375.
Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 952 (1991). Also at issue were the Government's arguments that: 1) the standard of review
was de novo; 2) no taking could occur until Benefits had applied for and been denied a mining
permit; 3) the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act did not prohibit Benefits from mining
"Whitney coal;" and 4) the Claims Court's failure to consider Congress' motivation. Id
' Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 416-17 (Cl. Ct. 1989), aftd. 926
F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991).
'"' Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1178.
'2 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.§§ 1201-1328 (1994).
'2' Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1172, 1174.
" ld. at 1172.
'29 Id. at 1174.
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under the coal exchange provision.' 30 The Federal Circuit fully agreed
with the Claims Court's evaluation of this argument as "completely off
the mark.' 3' The Claims Court had seized upon the fact that Wyoming
recognized a distinction between the mineral and surface estates and
mineral rights clearly were property within the scope of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
132
In addition, relying primarily on Penn Central, the Government
contended the existence of the coal exchange'33 preserved any economic
value of the Whitney coal.' 34 The Court noted its previous distinction
of Penn Central as a situation where the specific regulation was not
intended to take an interest in land. 35 Under the circumstances of Penn
Central, the owner retained the railroad station, which could continue
to profitably operate in the usual manner, as opposed to the case at bar
in which the Claims Court had found a total deprivation of the Whitney
coal property. 
136
Furthermore, the Court found the mere existence of the statutory
exchange provision confirmed the presence of a taking. On a previous
appeal the Court had held:
the exchange transaction is a method of ascertaining and
paying just compensation for a taking, which may be
negotiated and agreed upon either before or after the taking
itself, and is optional with the claimants, who may reject any
exchange and pursue a money award under the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. §1491.13
The Court reasoned there existed no logical purpose in an offer to pay
unless something had been taken. 138 Hence, to hold the presence of a
'30 Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1174.
131 Id.
132 Id. (citation omitted).
3 See 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5) (1994). The coal exchange exists as a system under which
there can be a previous agreement to payment of just compensation and subsequent to the taking a
claimant can either accept the offered compensation or pursue and action under the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
'3' Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1175.
135 id
136 Id.
'37 Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 752 F.2d 1554, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
13 Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1176. The specific statutory provision on which the court
relied states: "It is the policy of congress that the Secretary shall develop and carry out a coal
exchange program to acquire private fee coal precluded from being mined by the restrictions of this
paragraph (5) in exchange for federal coal which is not so precluded." Id.
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statutory provision for a coal exchange precluded the finding of a taking
in a case such as this would eviscerate the constitutional guarantee of
just compensation.
39
As such, rejection of relief under the coal exchange provision by no
means served to extinguish Whitney Benefits' claim. Alternatively, the
Tucker Act provides that:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort .... 40
By virtue of this statutory provision, the Claims Court retained
jurisdiction over Benefits' claim and remained vested with authority
"[t]o provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by [a]
judgment.... "'
Perhaps the most interesting facet of the Whitney Benefits decision
is the Claims Court's recognition of both surface and mineral rights,
which offered an avenue by which the Supreme Court could avoid
debating the total versus partial takings dichotomy. The Federal Circuit
appeared to give great deference to Whitney Benefits' investment-
backed expectations, in that any proffered alternative uses of the
property (i.e. farming) were not of proportional value in relation to the
initial investment incentive (surface mining of coal). Thus, the
qualification that Whitney Benefits had been deprived of all
economically viable use of its coal property was made.
C. Yancey v. United States
Yancey v. United States 42 does not address a real property taking as
is traditionally viewed under a Fifth Amendment compensation action.
Rather, at issue was the award of compensation to turkey farmers who
sold healthy turkey breeder stock-purchased for the purpose of selling
139 id.
'40 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
14' 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (1994).
142 Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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hatching turkey eggs to customers out of state-at a 77% reduction in
value resulting from a poultry quarantine. 43 In an effort to control an
outbreak of lethal Avian Influenza, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) imposed a quarantine prohibiting the interstate shipment of live
poultry, manure from poultry, litter used by poultry, carcasses, eggs, and
certain equipment.'" Tests revealed that the Yanceys' flock was
unaffected by the disease. 45
After an effort to maintain the flock, the Yanceys decided that
attempting to keep the birds alive indefinitely would be uneconomical.t"
Upon selling the flock for meat, which was not an economically viable
alternative and not the purpose for which the turkeys had been raised,
the Yanceys received $20,887." The USDA denied the Yanceys' claim
of $63,556 for indemnity under the regulation because the flock was
healthy at the time of sale.' As a result of the USDA's denial, the
Yanceys initiated suit in the U.S. Claims Court alleging an
uncompensated taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment
because the regulation's prevention of interstate travel had destroyed all
the economic value of their property. 49
Applying the Penn Central ad hoc factual inquiry, the Claims Court
found the quarantine imposition resulted in a 77% reduction in the value
of the turkey breeder stock. 50 The Claims Court concluded that the
Yanceys were entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment
since "a regulation... can be a taking if its effect on a landowner's
ability to put his property to productive use is sufficiently severe.. 5 '
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the Government argued that the
diminution in the value of the turkeys was entirely too small to constitute
143 id.
'4 Id. at 1536. Initially, the outbreak had occurred in Pennsylvania and subsequently mild
forms of the disease appeared in counties of Maryland and Virginia, including Rockingham County,
Virginia, where the Yanceys' turkey farm was located. Id.
"4 5d
" I The Yanceys spent up to $1,800 per week in effort to keep the flock alive.
"47 Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1536.
4 d See 9 C.F.R. §53.2(b) (1990) (the regulation applicable to areas such as the Yanceys'
authorized payment of up to 100% of the "expense of purchase, destruction and disposition of
animals and materials required to be destroyed because of being contaminated by or exposed to lethal
avian influenza.").
'49 Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1536-37.
"o /I at 1539. The Claims Court determined that the value of the breeder stock to be reduced
from $91,616 to $20,887, the amount received from slaughter. d
'"' Id at 1540 (citing Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1053 (1987)).
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a compensable taking. 152 However, the appellate court agreed with the
trial court and did not read earlier "precedents as creating an automatic
numerical barrier preventing compensation, as a matter of law, in cases
involving a smaller percentage diminution in value."'153 The Claims
Court properly weighed all the relevant considerations, including
percentage diminution in value under the modem Penn Central
approach, and concluded the Yanceys had suffered a severe economic
impact." The court determined the ultimate consequences of the
Government's action could not be ignored, and as a result of the
regulatory restrictions the Yanceys were left with no option other than
selling their entire turkey breeder flock.
55
An additional objection the government waged was the Claims
Court's evaluation of the fair market value of the Yanceys' breeder
flock. "However, [the Federal Circuit adhered with precedent in
holding] the fair market value of property under the Fifth Amendment
can include an assessment of the property's capacity in negotiating a fair
price for the property."' 56 Therefore, the Claims Court rejected the
Government's cost-based standard entirely."i 7 The court also concluded
that the Yanceys' entire flock was wiped out through no fault of their
own, and because they adhered to the regulations imposed by the USDA
they could no longer endure the economic impact of maintaining a live
turkey breeder flock. 58
Interestingly, as in Andrus,159 the Yanceys' claim was founded on
the taking of personal as opposed to real property. The Federal Circuit
rejected the Government's attack on the Claims Court's principal
reliance upon cases involving the ownership of real property." ° Rather,
the court concluded that the reasoning in those cases was "equally
applicable to other significant property interests besides land ownership.
There is no doubt that other property interests are also protected by the
Fifth Amendment .... [T]he Yanceys' ownership of their turkey flock
deserves just as much protection as if ownership of their farm had been
112 Id at 1541 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in
value caused by zoning not a taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5%
diminution in value not a taking)).
m Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1541.
I Id. The court referred to the earlier cases cited in note 153.
15 Id
156 Id. at 1542 (citations omitted).
15 d.
"a Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1543.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.




Perhaps the most pertinent aspect of Yancey is the fact that neither
court 61 was willing to provide compensation for what would ordinarily
be deemed a "partial" regulatory taking. The Yanceys remained in
absolute possession of their property. However, they were divested of
their investment-backed expectations because the quarantine curtailed
use of the flock for production of hatching turkey eggs. The court did
not require that all economic value be destroyed but was satisfied with
a 77% diminution. Perhaps the court's reasoning rests in the fact that
the Yanceys were left with no means by which to generate income from
their poultry flock as a result of adhering to USDA regulations designed
to protect the public.
D. Loveladies Harbor v. United States
Loveladies Harbor v. United States163 further illustrates the Claims
Court's reluctance to accept a Government defense that the property in
question retains some form of residual value. In 1956, landowners
purchased property consisting of approximately 250 acres located in
Ocean County, New Jersey.' As of May, 1982, 199 acres had been
improved by dredge and fill and developed with vacation homes which
were principally sold to the public. 165 As a result of state and federal
regulations governing the use of wetlands,' 66 the remaining fifty-one
acres were prevented from being developed absent an authorizing
permit. 167 Subsequent to denial of the necessary permit, the landowners
filed suit in the Claims Court seeking just compensation for the taking
161 Id. at 1540-41 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that
Fifth Amendment protection extended to intangible trade-secret property)).
162 This reference is to both the Claims Court and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
163 Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), aff'd 28 F.3d 1171 (1994).
164 id
' Id.
'6 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1995) (defining wetlands as those areas where the water table
is at, near, or above the land surface for a significant amount of time, creating saturated soils
resulting in the production of plants which can grow absent atmospheric oxygen).
'67 Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. at 154. See New Jersey Wetlands Act of 1970 (codified at
N.J.S.A. 13:9A-1 et seq. (1991)) (pursuant to the Act the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection administers the state's fill permit program for regulated wetlands); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994) (the United States Army Corps of Engineers grants or denies dredge
and fill permits pertaining to wetlands).
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of 11.5 acres of wetlands and one acre of uplands.'68
According to the landowners' appraisers, the real value of the
property with all permits in place was estimated at $200,000 per acre.169
Appraisers for both the landowners and the Government agreed that
following the regulatory imposition, in absence of the requisite permits,
the best use of the property would be for environmental conservation or
recreational purposes. 70  Under such use, the fair market value was
estimated at $1,000 per acre.'71 Yet, the Government's appraiser
concluded the upland acre may have additional value should a potential
buyer perceive it as development property. 72  It seems the
Government's appraiser was basing his assessment on the chance of a
potential buyer erroneously perceiving the property could be developed
for any purpose.1' Aside from its own expert's testimony, the
Government subsequently asserted the landowner's failure "to explore
the possibilities of using the property as a marina, for a mitigation site,
for aquaculture, and for sale to neighbors who might be interested in
preserving their unobstructed water views."' 74 The court dismissed these
assertions as not having been demonstrated to be reasonably probable
and practicable uses.17
5
Cross-examination revealed the appraisal of $1,000 per acre was
inclusive of the property's potential value for hunting, bird watching,
and growing and harvesting salt hay. 76  The court held there was no
"r Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. at 154. Initially, the landowners applied for a state permit
to fill the entire remaining fifty-one acres. Subsequent to a state agency settlement agreement,
landowners applied for a permit encompassing 12.5 acres. Following several state agency and court
reviews, landowners were granted a permit to fill 11.5 acres provided the wetlands destruction was
mitigated by the creation of a corresponding amount of new wetlands. A request that an additional
acre be filled was denied because it had already been filled (for a total of 12.5 acres). During this
same time, the landowners had applied to the Corps for the appropriate federal permit. The permit
application was amended at several points during the process but was eventually denied. Id.
"6 Id. at 156. In determining the fair market value of the property prior to the regulatory
action, the appraisers considered the gross value of the undeveloped land at $3,720,000 (taking into
account variations for lot sizes, shapes, views, and proximity to the water); the cost of preparing the
property for development at $900,500; and costs associated with complying with the state's
mitigation compromise at $161,500. d
17o Id at 158-59.
.7 Id. at 158. The figure was reached through the use of the market data approach. Id.
272 Id. at 158-159.
"7 Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. at 158-159.
174 id
175 id.
176 Id. at 158. There was further testimony which demonstrated that hunting would be
prohibited due to the acreage's close proximity to a residential area, and the fanning of salt hay




evidence that any of the proposed alternative uses would satisfy "the
standard of reasonable probability for adaptability and demand...., 77
Even if the Government could have successfully demonstrated that bird
watching served as an alternative use, there were no means by which to
establish a market for that use.
78
As a consequence of the dramatic decline in property value, the
landowners suffered a diminution of over 99%.1
7 9
The significance of this impact is heightened when it is recalled
that the $1,000 per acre figure represents a reasonable estimate
of what a government entity could be expected to pay for the
property, and is not the product of negotiations between a
willing buyer and seller under no duress. As a result of
government action, there is no market; the only potential buyer
is a governmental unit, and the only remaining value is a
nominal one."8
The court continued by concluding the severe economic impact suffered
by the landowners, coupled with the court's earlier determination that
a legitimate state interest was lacking, substantiated that a taking had
occurred. As such, the court awarded full compensation and required
the landowners to deed the 12.5 acre parcel of property to the
Government.1
8 l
E. Florida Rock Industries v. United States
Florida Rock Industries v. United States,8 2 a companion case to
Loveladies Harbor, has been in the throes of litigation since 1982 and
is perhaps the most insightful case regarding the issues of partial impact
and just compensation. The case commenced in 1982 when Florida
Rock Industries (Florida Rock) filed suit against the Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) following the Corps' denial to issue Florida Rock a
I ld. at 159 (citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934)).
'7 Loveladies Harbor, 21 CI. Ct. at 158.
' Id at 160. The value of the property before the taking was $2,658,000 and following the
permit denial the value of the property stood at $12,500. Id.
'I Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
'I' Id. at 160-61. As an aside, it is interesting to note that landowners had indicated at trial
their intention to convey the entire remaining fifty-one acre parcel of property to the government, not
merely the 12.5 acres at issue. Id.
82 Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1053 (1995) [hereinafter Florida Rock IV].
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permit to mine the limestone beneath a tract of wetlands located in Dade
County, Florida." 3 The Corps' investigation determined the proposed
mining activity "would cause irremediable loss of an ecologically
valuable wetland parcel and would create undesirable water turbidity."'
' 4
Florida Rock sought monetary compensation from the United States
alleging that the Corps action constituted an uncompensated regulatory
taking of its private property for public use in violation of the Fifth
Amendment." 5
In the original action (Florida Rock 1), the Claims Court concluded
a regulatory taking had occurred and that compensation was due by
virtue of the dredge and fill permit denial.' 6 The court applied a value
of $10,500 per acre to the property prior to the taking, and it estimated
the remaining value to be negligible because rock mining was the only
viable economic use of the land.'87 The court awarded Florida Rock
$1,029,000 plus attorney fees and simple interest."' On appeal (Florida
Rock II), the Court of Appeals held the Claims Court had undertaken an
inappropriate analysis for determining the value of the property.1
8 9
Rather than focusing on the immediate use value following the taking,
the inquiry should have been into the "fair market value" for such land
in the surrounding vicinity. 90
On remand (Florida Rock III), the issue of fair market value was
highly contested.' However, the Claims Court eventually conceded to
3 Id. Florida Rock had purchased a 1,560 acre wetlands tract in 1972, prior to the enactment
of the Clean Water Act. The purchase price was $2,964,000, or.$1,900 per acre. The permit to mine
the limestone was sought under § 404 of the Clean Water Act. Initially, Florida Rock applied for a
permit for the entire tract but the Corps responded that permits would only be issued for parcels
which would meet mining requirements for three years, which in Florida Rock's case was 98 acres.
It is the denial of the permit for the 98 acre parcel which was at issue in this case. Id at 1562-63.
'84 Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1563.
' Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985) affid in part, vacated in part, 791
F.2d 893(Fed. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Florida Rock I].
186 Id at 179.
'" Id. (citation omitted). The value per acre was determined by the Claims Court to vary with
the size of the parcel. The smaller the tract the greater a premium per acre. Thus, the original
purchase price of $1,900 per acre was no longer applicable due to the vast reduction in the tract size
(1,560 acres versus 98 acres). Id See supra note 183.
's Florida Rock 1, 8 CI.Ct. at 160.
"s Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893,903 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1053 (1987) [hereinafter Florida Rock 11].
19o d
91 Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), vacated and remanded, 18 F.3d
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Florida Rock 111]. Numerous real estate assessors testified on
both sides regarding the fair market value of the property with estimates ranging from $4,000 per
acre to $10,000 per acre. The Government attempted to establish the fair market value based upon
the property tax assessment calculated on comparable sales of nearby parcels during the relevant time
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Florida Rock's argument that the Court of Appeals' command in
Florida Rock II required "a detailed inquiry into the motivations and
sophistication of buyers of the comparable properties upon which
assessment is based."'" Florida Rock had conducted a complex survey
which concluded no similarly situated buyers possessed the requisite
knowledge of the regulatory scheme to qualify their property purchases
as reliably comparable.'93 Thus, Florida Rock's assessor appraised the
parcel's fair market value following the denial of the permit under the
regulatory regime as negligible.'" The Claims Court concurred with
this analysis and reinstated the $1,029,000 award with compound
interest.'" Given the complexity and duration of this case, it is worth
examining the individual stages of litigation.
1. Florida Rock I
In Florida Rock 1, the Court reasoned that with respect to regulatory
takings, one must examine the "substance, rather than the legal
trappings, of what is left as a result of the Government's regulatory
action."' 96 Since Florida Rock had purchased the property solely for the
purpose of mining the underlying limestone, the Government regulation
served to strip the land of its only economically. viable use.' 97 Any
remaining incidences of ownership, such as the right to sell, lease, or
exclude others, were rendered meaningless since the property could not
be put to any productive use. 98 The court rejected the Government's
argument that the property could be held for a long term investment.1
"Relegating plaintiff to passively holding the land in the hope that the
period. Florida Rock successfully persuaded the Claims Court that valuation on property for tax
purposes was not binding for purposes of establishing fair market value in a condemnation
proceeding. Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1562-63.
'9' Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1563-64. Based upon this interpretation, Florida Rock had
developed a survey which in the opinion of the Claims Court in Florida Rock II was "admittedly
novel." Florida Rock 11I, 21 Cl. Ct. at 173.
193 Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1564. "Implicit in this result is the assumption that no one with
full knowledge of the regulatory regime would be willing to gamble that concern for the ecological
importance of the wetlands would give way in the future to the economics of development pressure
from nearby Miami." Id.
194 Id
'95 Florida Rock 111, 21 Cl. Ct. at 176. The court further order Florida Rock to tender the deed
to the 98 acre parcel upon satisfaction of the judgment. Id.
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regulatory climate may someday change cannot be deemed a viable
economic use.... " Hence, deprivation of any realistic utility required
compensation."'
Similarly, with respect to the issue of fair market value, Florida
Rock I asserts the premise that given the timeless nature of property, no
regulatory action could ever entirely eliminate a market value. 2 2 In
some circumstances there may be investors who would be willing to
purchase regulated property based on the speculation that the restriction
may be lifted at some time in the future. 0 3  However, the court
concluded that an attempt to engage in speculation of this nature could
not defeat a regulatory takings claim. 204 "If the existence of such a
residual market for the property could defeat a claim for a regulatory
taking, no regulatory taking could ever be proved and the concept would
be rendered meaningless." 2 5 Rather, the court relied on Florida Rock's
expert, who testified that "fair market value subject to the regulation was
a myth: the only buyers who would pay any substantial sum for the
property were foreigners, unaware of the physical nature of the property
and of the legal restrictions on its use, victims of fraud or self-
deception., 20
Since there could be no legitimate determination of "fair market
value" it was necessary to consider the immediate use value of the
property. Again, upon the court's determination that the property could
not be put to a productive use, it reached the conclusion that a
compensable taking had occurred.2°
2. Florida Rock I
The appellate court disapproved of several of the Claims Court's
findings, including the utilization of immediate valuation as opposed to
fair market value.20" The court found the trial judge's interpretation of
2'o Florida Rock!, 8 Cl. Ct. at 166.
202 d at 167.
201 Id at 167-68.
Id at 167 (citations omitted).
2 Florida Rock 111, 21 Cl. Ct.at 171.
Id. at 179.
2m Florida Rock !!, 791 F.2d 893 (1986). The Federal Circuit further rejected the trial court's
inquiry into whether the proposed activity would have polluted the waters, and application of the
evidence in determining whether the case constituted an actual taking. Affirmed were the trail
court's finding that the 98 acre parcel was the only property in dispute, and the pre-taking value of
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case law requiring there be no remaining immediate use of the property
to be erroneous.2' In addition, it was deemed error for the trial court to
have excluded testimony from the Government's real estate expert, who
testified that a market existed for speculators willing "to forego
immediate income in hope of long-term gain. 21° If Florida Rock could
obtain a "solid and adequate" fair market value for the property, there
would be a sufficient remaining use to forestall the determination of a
taking and a need for Governmental compensation.2 '
3. Florida Rock III
On remand, the Claims Court stressed the court of appeals'
language requiring "the ultimate fact to be proven is the existence or
absence of a market among knowledgeable investors, aware of all
restrictions on the land. 212 In applying an ad hoc analysis, the court
undertook a lengthy review of the appraisal reports and expert
testimony, only to conclude a fair market value could not be reasonably
calculated since it was impossible to step back in time and impute
knowledge of the restriction to investors.2 3 Due to the absence of an
investment market and any other economically viable use of the
property, the Claims Court found its original value appropriate.21 4 In
other words, the Claims Court relied on the same evidence and
testimony, and while merely couching the analysis in different terms, it
reached the same conclusion.
However, Florida Rock III reached even further by considering
when a substantial reduction in property value should operate as a
sufficient basis for concluding a taking has occurred.21' Principally, the
court emphasized the necessity of evaluating the property owner's basis,
or investment in the property and the ability to recoup this investment
or make a profit while subject to the regulation." 6 Operation of this
inquiry is equivalent to the Penn Central investment-backed
expectations analysis.217 The fact that Florida Rock purchased the
the property was $10,500 per acre. Id.
2" /ad at 901-03.
210 Id. at 902.
211 id.
212 Florida Rock 111, 21 C1. Ct. at 171.
213 Id. at 161-174.
214 Id
213 Id. at 175.
216 Florida Rock lL, 21 C1. Ct. at 175.
217 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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property solely for the purpose of mining limestone and virtually no
other business was available in which the initial investment be recouped,
the substantial reduction in value was sufficient to sustain a regulatory
taking.218
4. Florida Rock IV
The court of appeals vacated and remanded Florida Rock III,
holding: (1) for the purpose of determining fair market value, there was
no requirement for a detailed inquiry into the motivation and
sophistication of buyers of like property; (2) the evidence did not
support the conclusion that all economic use or value of the property
was taken; and, (3) the Claims Court would be required to undertake a
balancing of competing interests to determine whether a compensable
regulatory taking had occurred.219 The court quickly clarified its opinion
in Florida Rock H as not having imposed the necessity of engaging in
an investigation of the particular sophistication and motivation of
buyers. 220 Rather, the central question was to focus on the fair market
value prior to the imposition of the regulatory restraint and the extent of
any variance from that value.22' To abandon the use of evaluating a
speculative market was considered error because monetary
compensation from a speculative market was equally as ordinary and
satisfactory as any other market.222 Thus, to conclude the nonexistence
of a speculative market was "at odds both with common sense and with
[the court's] directions in Florida Rock IL
'
223
The court recognized the ongoing debate with respect to the
appropriate method of determining whether a regulatory taking had
occurred. The chosen formula remained the Penn Central test of
balancing several pragmatic considerations, including: (1) the economic
impact suffered by the claimant as a result of the regulation; (2) the
extent of the regulation's interference with investment-backed
expectations; and, (3) the character of the government action.224 Under
certain conditions the economic impact factor, standing alone, can be
2. Florida Rock 111, 21 CI. Ct. at 176.
219 Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d 1560(1994).
Id. at 1565-67.
"' Id.
I d. at 1567.
d3 la at 1567.
22 Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1564 (citations omitted).
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decisive and eliminate the need to balance any other factors.2z Should
the regulation categorically prohibit all other economically beneficial
use of the land, resulting in complete destruction of all economic value
associated with private ownership, the regulatory effect is equivalent to
a permanent occupation requiring compensation.226 However, should
the regulation result merely in the partial destruction of the available
economic benefit, the case will not fall within the Supreme Court's
"categorical takings" rule.227
It appears as though the Claims Court had satisfied the Federal
Circuit's inquiry into the extent to which the regulation interferes with
the investment-backed expectations of the landowner, as well as the
character of the government action. Florida Rock's investment-backed
expectations were to be realized through the mining of the underlying
limestone. These objectives were clearly destroyed upon the denial of
a mining permit. This fact is further emphasized by Florida Rock's
subsequent purchase of other property to meet its mining
requirements.228 Furthermore, it was undisputed that the Government
was authorized to impose such a regulation under its police power.229
Thus, the principal inquiry focused on determination of what economic
use, as measured by the market value, remained following imposition of
the regulation. Not until the remaining market value of Florida Rock's
property was established could there be resolution of the question as to
whether the economic impact on the property owner was severe enough
to constitute a compensable regulatory taking.
In order to appropriately address this matter, two issues required
determination: (1) "whether the regulation must destroy a certain
proportion of a property's economic use or value in order for a
compensable taking of property occur"; and, (2) "how to determine, in
any given case, what that proportion is.'"23° Thus, the question is posed:
does an owner who is denied substantial but not complete economic use
and benefit from his property suffer a partial taking requiring
compensation?"'
_2 Id. at 1564-1565 (citations omitted).
2 Id. at 1564-65. The court referred to Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) discussed supra part III A.
227 Id. at 1564-65.
22 Florida Rock III, 21 Cl. Ct. at 176.
229 Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1570-7 1.
=o Id. at 1568.
231 Id.
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Logically, the amount of just compensation should be
proportional to the value of the interest taken as compared to
the total value of the property, up to and including total
deprivation, whether the taking is by physical occupation for
the public to use as a park, or by regulatory imposition to
preserve property as a wetland so that it may be used by the
public for ground water recharge and other ecological
purposes.232
The principal difficulty is in drawing the line between what
qualifies as a partial regulatory taking and the mere "diminution in
value" of otherwise legitimately regulated use.233 The court concluded
the only means available of formulating a proper judgment would be
through the application of an ad hoc factual inquiry.2 4 Although the
Federal Circuit discussed the historical underpinnings of takings
jurisprudence and prior case law, the only further guidance developed
for the Claims Court was that in ascertaining whether the Government
acted within its proper role, the Court must operate under "the working
assumption that the Government will neither prejudice private citizens,
unfairly shifting the burden of a public good onto a few people, nor act
arbitrarily or capriciously, that is, will not act to disappoint reasonable
investment-backed expectations. ' 25 The court continued by stating that
when the government acts as a middleman between private interest to
further an environmental gain from which all may benefit, "the shared
diminution of free choice that results may not rise to the level of
constitutionally required compensation. ' '26
In addition, in order to demonstrate the property owner's loss of
economic use resulting from the regulation, the trial court is to consider
whether: (1) there exist any direct compensating benefits accruing to the
property and others similarly situated as a result of the regulation; (2) the
benefits are widely shared through the community, though the
associated costs are focused on a few; and, (3) the alternative permitted
activities are economically realistic and available given the setting and
232 Id. at 1569 (citation omitted).
I ld. at 1569 (1994); see supra note 20 and accompanying text (the court continued by
quoting Justice Holmes' declaration in Pennsylvania Coal regarding the effective operation of
government and the requirement of compensable takings).
34 Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1570.





One can hardly state that the Federal Circuit cast any bright light on
resolution of the appropriate test for determining when a compensable
partial regulatory taking has occurred. Rather, following a restatement
of the ad hoc factual inquiry, the court pondered the appropriateness of
considering whether the Government had acted fairly and reasonably.23
This discussion provided nothing more than what had previously been
announced in Nollan.239 .The sum of the court's pronouncement was a
requirement that the restrictive condition substantially advance a
legitimate state interest.240
The only distinction was the court's qualification that in some
instances diminution may not rise to the level of constitutionally
required compensation. 24' The court appeared to rest this conclusion on
the notion that under certain circumstances the government must act as
an intermediary between the private interest and the public good.242 Yet,
the court stopped short of stating when the regulation reaches the critical
level of diminution to trigger the Takings Clause.243 It simply did not
address the main issue at bar-the question of the requisite proportional
amount of decreased value. Instead, recognizing that no clear line had
been drawn, the court declared that "[o]ver time ... enough cases will
be decided with sufficient care and clarity that the line will more clearly
emerge."' If this statement was intended to serve as the court's critique
of the majority opinion, it appears to be accurate.
IV. LEGITIMACY OF "ECONOMIC IMPACT" AND "INVESTMENT-
BACKED EXPECTATIONS" ANALYSES
Of the three-pronged balancing test employed in ad hoc inquiry
cases, the Supreme Court appears to grant considerable judicial weight
to both the actual "economic impact" suffered by the claimant and the
loss of reasonable "investment backed expectations." Frequently the
Court will couch its analysis of these factors in terms of the degree to
13 Id. at (1994).
" This is especially curious in this case given that the appropriateness of the Government's
regulatory scheme was never questioned.
See supra notes 87-113 and accompanying text.




2" Id (emphasis added).
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which the claimant has been deprived of the economically beneficial use
of the property.245 In fact, there should be no difference between the
reduction in value or use, since the property owner has ultimately been
deprived of a property right that would have otherwise accompanied
ownership absent the regulatory restriction. The central problem with
this form of inquiry is the Courts' continued vacillation as to whether it
should focus on the current market value, or the difference between the
fair market value of the property prior to the regulation and following
the regulatory restrictions.
A. Economic Impact
What exactly the Court is attempting to determine in evaluating the
regulatory economic impact is somewhat convoluted and confusing. In
certain instances it may be possible to comprehend consideration of an
economic rationale, such as the facts surrounding Penn Central.2w In
that particular case, the property owner was permitted to continue the
ordinary use and functional operation of the property as it had originally
been designated.247 Given the legitimate state interest in preserving the
terminal's physical plant as a historical structure and the owner's ability
to reap the economic gain associated with superadjacent air rights by
virtue of the rights' free transferability, 248 it is difficult to perceive any
consequential economic loss actually suffered by the property owners.
However, most cases do not give rise to such an easily balanced
exchange, but address matters in which the property owner has been
legally stripped of some valuable property use for which there is no
trade-off available to establish equilibrium.
Hence, the question lingers as to what extent the economic impact
must devastate the landowner in order for a compensation claim to
prevail. In some instances the Court has refused to avail the property
owner relief absent the deprivation of all economic value.249 Yet, under
similar circumstances the Court is clearly willing to compensate an
owner for a mere diminution in property value."0 It is difficult, if not
impossible, to align these two polar perspectives. The most unfortunate
245 Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1571 (citation omitted)..
246 See supra text accompanying notes 25-39.
247 See supra text accompanying note 34.
's See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
2'9 See supra text accompanying notes 104-121 and 122-141.




aspect is the Supreme Court's unwillingness to confront the "partial"
taking issue given the opportunity. Rather, the courts continuously
cloak analysis under the rubric of "economic impact," which case law
has routinely demonstrated as having no legitimate interpretation. As
such, economic impact theory should fall squarely on its face given the
fact that it operates as a loophole through which a "partial" regulatory
taking can go uncompensated-under the guise that the economic
impact suffered by the claimant lacks the requisite severity to trigger the
Takings Clause. Since there is no measuring stick with which the courts
are willing to adhere in balancing this factor, it should be either
eliminated or enunciated, because presently it serves only as a
superficial term permitting subjective judicial interpretation.
B. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
The investment-backed expectations analysis equally fails to serve
as a legitimate balancing criterion. Suppose a person purchased a piece
of land with the immediate intention of raising tobacco on the property.
The purchaser is aware of mineral rights accompanying the parcel;
however, he desires to be a farmer. After some years of farming, the
tobacco market declines drastically and tobacco farming is no longer
profitable. Thus, the purchaser pursues exploration of the mineral rights
and discovers vast amounts of X deposited in the property. Mining
activities are undertaken and the property owner enjoys several years of
reaping benefit from the land. Subsequently, the government imposes
a regulation restricting the mining of X and sues to enjoin the mining
operation. Under the current takings analysis, the property owner would
not be entitled to compensation because the investment-backed
expectations were allocated for the sole purpose of farming the land, a
use that remains entirely available." Thus, the purchaser's expectations
were not diminished because the economically viable purpose of the
investment in agricultural land remains.
This notion supports the Federal Circuit's assertion in Florida Rock
IV,252 in which monetary compensation from a speculative market was
deemed equally as ordinary and satisfactory as any other market. 3
However, the court of appeals addressed the acceptability of a
"' Naturally, the property owner could argue the investment costs associated with the mining
endeavors; however, such is beyond the point of this example.
252 Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d 1560 (1994).
53 ld. at 1567.
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speculative market in the context of assessing a market value on
regulated property for the purpose of determining whether a
compensable taking had occurred.'54 It hardly seems reasonable that the
courts are willing to focus on the purchaser's investment-backed
expectations in resolving the initial taking question, however; if the
regulatory action is decided to have affected the purchaser's sole
investment purpose, the courts want to necessarily assign a hypothetical,
arbitrary market value. In this writer's opinion, the court in Florida
Rock I 55 drew the correct conclusion:
The existence of a market for the plaintiffs property, despite
what the court has found to be its uselessness for all productive
activity, is based upon speculators' expectations that they will
be able to pass the property on to hapless investors who do not
understand the nature and scope of the restrictions on its use, or
can be persuaded that the restrictions are transitory or can be
circumvented. 6
As clearly expressed in Loveladies Harbor v. United States,257 under
some circumstances the imposition of the government regulation totally
eliminates any available market for the property. 8 The only possible
buyer is the government.259 Such a condition does not give rise to the
real estate industry's definition of market value as:
[t]he most probable price, as of a specified date, in cash.., for
which the specified property rights should sell after reasonable
exposure in the competitive market under all conditions
requisite to a fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting
prudently, knowledgeably, and for self-interest, and assuming
that neither is under undue duress.25
Similarly, Florida Rock IV 261 exemplifies the circumstances under
which there is no meaningful way to ascertain a market value absent the
2' See supra notes 208-211 and accompanying text.
25 Florida Rock 1, 8 C1. Ct. 160 (1985).
2_6 Id. at 167.
257 Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
' See supra text accompanying note 182.
2"i
' See Loveladies Harbor, 21 Ci. Ct. at 156 (citation omitted).
2' Florida Rock lV, 18F.3d 1560(1994).
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availability of any informed or willing buyers. The continued insistence
on establishing a mythical market value persists as not only
unreasonable but unfair.
CONCLUSION
Given the judiciary's failure or unwillingness to establish a
threshold at which the Takings Clause will be triggered, Congress has
engaged in an attempt to enact legislation vastly broadening the rights
of property owners through expanding the scope of what is considered
a regulatory taking. On March 3, 1995, as part of the House of
Representatives GOP "Contract with America," the Republican led
House successfully passed the Private Property Protection Act of 1995
by a margin of 277 to 148.262
Under the terms of the Act, the federal government will be required
to pay just compensation to private property owners when a regulatory
restriction limits an otherwise lawful use of their property causing the
"fair market value" to be devalued by 20% or more.263 In addition, the
Act entitles property owners to compensation if regulations imposed by
the Endangered Species Act,' the Clean Water Act2M wetlands permit
program or farm conservation and federal irrigation programs adversely
affect their property values. 266 In instances where the property is
devalued by 50% or more, the government is required to purchase the
property at the owner's request.
267
Only days prior to passing this legislation, the House acted to
impose a moratorium on regulatory rule making.268 The Regulatory
Transition Act of 1995269 sets more stringent requirements by
commanding that regulations satisfy cost-benefit and risk assessments
standards, including an analysis of costs resulting from the loss of
property rights. 270 Proponents of this legislative movement view it "as
262 H.R 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
2' Marianne Lavelle, Closing the Property Rights Contract, NAT'LLJ., Mar. 27,1995, at Al;
The original version of the bill required compensation if the property was devalued by 10% or more.
264 Endangered Species Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
26 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
2 Tom Kenworthy, House Passes Landowner Rights Bill, Environmental Enforcers Would
Be Restrained, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1995, at Al; see also Lavelle, supra note 263.
267 H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 3(a) (1995).
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a way to prevent a runaway government from stripping ordinary citizens
of their property through environmental restrictions, such as protecting
wetlands., 271 However, opponents assert that legislation of this nature
will "create an open-ended financial entitlement and ultimately rob the
government of its ability to protect wildlife and vital habitat through
existing environmental laws. 272
Regardless from which side of the debate one approaches, there is
little room for argument that legislation of this nature would essentially
serve to strip the judicial branch of constitutional interpretation of the
Takings Clause. Perhaps this result could have been avoided had the
Court not continuously waxed and waned over deciding the limits of
governmental restriction resulting in the loss of property value. Under
the legislative bills being considered, the Penn Central balancing testZ
3
would be set aside for a straightforward appraisal of the property value
prior to and following the regulatory imposition.274 Now at stake are
valuable environmental, health, and safety regulations which could
potentially be limited in enforcement or tabled indefinitely. The bottom
line appears to-be that since the judiciary failed to speak consistently or
conclusively on regulatory takings, Congress has taken it upon itself to
determine when enough is enough.
z' Kenworthy, supra note 266, at Al.
m Kenworthy, supra note 266, at At.
273 See supra text accompanying notes 21-39.
274 Lavelle, supra note 263, at A 1, 30.
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